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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
REID D. BENCH and ALTA M.

1

BENCH, his wife,

J

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

(
(

ERMA PACE,
Defendant and Respondent.

Case No
13929

'

I
]

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs in this action sued for specific performance of a Lease-Option Agreement, and Defendant
counterclaimed for unlawful detainer, also raising defenses of fraud and mutual mistake.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

^

A trial without jury was held before the Honorable
Allen B. Sorensen, Judge in the Fourth Judicial District Court, on September 25 and 26, 1974. The Court
held that Mrs. Pace, Defendant, had sustained her burden of pursuasion "by clear, satisfactory, definite and
1
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convincing evidence" that at the time of the execution
of the lease option, neither Plaintiffs nor Defendant
intended to create an interest in Plaintiffs in the oil,
gas and mineral estate in the subject property and that
failure of said lease option to contain an express reservation of mineral rights was due to mutual mistake of
the parties. The trial court further found that Plaintiffs had failed to properly exercise their option to purchase, and that the Plaintiffs had agreed to remain under
the lease arrangement. Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Judgment were entered accordingly, decreeing that (1) the agreement be reformed to conform
to the intent of the parties; (2) Plaintiffs are in unlawful detainer; (3) Defendant is entitled to past-due rent;
and (4) the lease-option agreement had terminated.

NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Defendant-Respondent seeks an order from this
Court affirming the judgment of the trial court.
<.w

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Defendant cannot acquiesce in Plaintiffs' Statement
of Facts. The omission of pertinent facts supporting
the trial court's decision necessarily places Plaintiffs'
Statement in the category of Argument. We will endeavor to bring to this Court's attention such missing
evidence, together with connecting circumstances deemed
essential to establish logical sequence.
•

•

."••

*

.

*

-

.

'

•

'

_

>;

?

•

'

r

.

Plaintiffs in this action are husband and wife who
moved to the Roosevelt, Utah, area in 1965. Defendant

2
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is a widow who owns a. small farm northwest of Roosevelt, Utah. The property in question consists of 120 acres
with a small home located thereon (T. 76, Ex. 2).1
In 1962, Defendant entered into an oil lease (Ex. 1)
involving her property. Three years later in September, 1965, Plaintiffs initiated discussions with Defendant for the purpose of leasing Defendant's farm. On
September 8, 1965, Plaintiffs, Defendant, and Defendant's son, Aaron Pace, executed a lease with an option
to purchase involving the subject property. The leaseoption agreement was prepared by an attorney upon the
instructions of Plaintiff Reid Bench (T. 17).
The testimony of the Defendant, Erma Pace, her
daughter, Dawn Brown, and her former daughter-inlaw, Carol Jameson, showed that prior to the execution
of the said lease-option agreement, the parties had
agreed that no oil, gas, or mineral rights were to be
transferred with the property (T. 78, 81, 110, 113, 116,
118). In fact, Plaintiff Reid Bench stated that he was
not interested in any oil, gas, or mineral rights, but
rather desired merely a place to live away from the
city (T. 116).
The parties continued to believe that the said oil,
gas, and mineral rights were not to be transferred with
the property. On two occasions in 1968 and 1969, Plaintiff Reid Bench offered to purchase a portion of Mrs.
Pace's oil, gas, and mineral rights, but she refused to
sell (T. 82).
i"T" refers to Transcript of the testimony and "Ex." refers to
Exhibit.
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Plaintiffs fell behind in their rental payments (See
Ex. 19, T. 52, 58), and on April 1,1969, Plaintiffs agreed
in writing to pay extra charges incurred by Defendant
for interest arising through Plaintiffs failure to make
timely payments under the lease-option agreement (Ex.
4). Plaintiffs never tendered payment of those excess
charges (T. 59).
On January 8, 1971, Plaintiff Keid Bench presented
a check in the amount of $2,000.00 to Defendant (Exs.
15, 18) in an attempt to exercise the option, and the
parties agreed that a new real estate sales agreement
for the sale of the property was necessary to complete
the transaction and commenced negotiations to arrive
at such a new agreement (see Exs. 6, 7, 8, 17, and 20).
However, the parties were unable to agree upon the
terms of such new agreement, and they mutually agreed
to return to the lease arrangement (Ex. 17, 10, 13, 12).
On April 5, 1971, Plaintiffs were advised by Defendant
that the $2,000.00 payment did not constitute a valid
exercise of the option and that either a new contract
must be executed or the Plaintiffs would continue on
the lease (Ex. 7). On June 2, 1971, the $2,000.00 was
sent by Defendant to Plaintiffs (Ex. 17). By letter
dated June 15, 1971, Plaintiffs accepted the remitted
$2,000.00, acquiesced in their return to the lease arrangement, and expressed the hope that some agreement could eventually be worked out (Ex. 10).
In the summer of 1972, Plaintiffs executed a ratification of Mrs. Pace's oil lease and a proof of possession
form, disclaiming any right to any oil under the subject
property (Exs. 12,13).
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On separate occasions in the fall of 1973, Plaintiff
Reid Bench advised two disinterested parties that he
never intended to purchase the oil, gas, and mineral
rights from Mrs. Pace and that he knew that she never
intended to sell them (T. 122, 129, 145). He further
stated that he first was given the idea that he could
claim the oil rights by a lawyer he had talked to concerning the lease seven years after the initial signing
took place (T. 121,122,145).
It was clear from the evidence as a whole that Mrs.
Pace did not know that the Plaintiffs claimed oil, gas,
and mineral rights in the property until she was served
with a copy of the complaint in this action. (T. 196,197.)
The Court so found (Finding of Fact No. 5).
Plaintiffs never complied with the requirements of
the option, and the lease eventually expired on September 15, 1973, approximately nine months after this lawsuit was filed.
Defendant served a notice to quit upon the Plaintiffs
in September, 1973, but Plaintiffs failed to vacate the
premises (Ex. 21).
ARGUMENT
1. The Standard of Review In This Case Is Whether
The Findings Of The Trial Court Are Supported
By Competent Evidence.
All of the findings of the trial court in this case are
buttressed by testimony of multiple witnesses and var5
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ious documents. If the evidence admitted at the trial is
competent evidence (which it is), there can be no question that the trial court's findings must be upheld.
Plaintiffs-Appellants' main argument in this case is that
the trial court should not have admitted some evidence
at the trial which showed the true intent of the parties
and their mutual mistake. If this court rules that the
evidence admitted by the trial court was properly admitted, then this case should be affirmed. HowartJi v.
Ostergaard, 30 Utah 2d 183, 515 P.2d 442 (1973); Olsen
v. Park Daughters Inv. Co., 29 Utah 2d 421, 511 P.2d 145
(1973).

2. The Trial Court Properly Admitted Parol Evidence In This Case, And The Contract Was
Properly Reformed.
In response to the complaint filed by Appellants,
the Defendant answered that there had been a mutual
mistake or fraud in the execution of the original leaseoption agreement. Plaintiffs objected to such a defense
and moved for a summary judgment.
Judge George E. Ballif entered a written ruling on
this motion on September 19, 1973,2 stating in part:
Although the parol evidence rule would ordinarily fix the operation of a written agreement
to the express language contained within the four
corners of the instrument and those things flowing therefrom by operation of law, the defend-

1

2

The record is not numbered by page and, therefore, the reference
to the record must be made by document title and date.
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ant's claim of a mutual mistake of fact or fraud
in the failure of the writing to provide for a
reservation of minerals where defendant claims
she relied upon plaintiffs and counsel secured by
plaintiffs to reduce the agreement, including the
reservation, to writing could, if proved, result
in a reformation of the agreement or an estoppel
against plaintiffs' enforcement of same.
At trial, Judge Sorensen concurred with Judge Ballif's decision and admitted testimony offered by Defendant to show the existence of such mutual mistake or
fraud. The pertinent portions of that testimony are set
out below:

M

A. [Mrs. Pace] Well, he wanted to lease
the farm with option to buy, and I told him at
the time, I said "Now, Mr. Bench, I want you
- to understand there will be no mineral rights to
go with the place." And he said, " I agree — or
I understand that." (T. 78)
He handed me the pen, the contract, and I
glanced over it, looked over it the best I could
with what time I had, and I took the pen in my
hand and was going to sign, and I looked at him,
and I said, "Mr. Bench, I want you to understand at this price there is no oil or mineral rights
to go with the place." And he said, " I understand, and I am not interested in your oil rights.''
(T. 81)
Well, yes, because it was agreed that the oil
right was to go with me. He was to get the farm
only. (T. 110).
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The Plaintiff, Mr. Bench, testified as follows:
Q [by Mr. Boyden]: At the time you had
your arrangement with Mrs. Pace in 1965, did you
then intend that you were leasing the minerals?
A [by Mr. Bench]: I never thought about
minerals, oil or gas. (T. 153-54).
Plaintiff Mrs. Bench was not called to testify during the trial because of alleged illness.
It has been repeatedly held that the parol evidence
is admissible in a case such as the one at hand. The
"black letter" rule is clearly stated by Professor Oorbin, Contracts, 536 (one vol. ed.):
Before the legal operation of any agreement
can be determined, however definitely it may be
embodied in a written "integration," it must be
interpreted by the court. For this process of
interpretation, the "parol evidence rule" does
not exclude evidence of prior communications and
understandings (although there may be some
other limitations on the extent to which such evidence may be used). Until a contract has been
interpreted, the court cannot know whether there
is an inconsistency between it and other agreements, oral or written, prior or subsequent. Before interpretation, a court cannot know what
it is that cannot be "varied or contradicted."
In addition, the "rule does not purport to exclude any testimony to prove fraud, illegality,
accident, or mistake; it does not prevent rescisj sion or a decree for reformation and enforcement." [Emphasis added.]

8
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Utah cases have followed this rule. Even the principal case cited in Plaintiffs' Brief concurs with the rule
as stated by Professor Corbin:
Parol evidence may be received to clarify
ambiguous language in a contract, to show what
the agreement was relative to filling in blanks,
and to supply omitted terms which were agreed
upon but inadvertently left out of the written
agreement. E. A. Strout Western Realty Agency,
Inc. v. Broderick, .... Utah 2d ...., 522 P.2d 144
(1974). [Emphasis added.]
In the present case, there was a clear intent to reserve the mineral rights to the Defendant. The parties
relied upon that intent for seven years. Defendant
asked the Court for reformation as soon as Plaintiffs
changed their position by filing the instant suit and
thereby making the need for the reservation clear.
Other Utah cases follow the rule cited above. See
Peterson v. Eldredge, 122 Utah 96, 246 P.2d 886, 888
(1952); Cram v. Reynolds, 55 Utah 384, 186 Pac. 100
(1919); Fox Film Corp. v. Ogden Theater Co., 82 Utah
279, 17 P.2d 297 (1932); Nordfors v. Knight, 90 Utah
114, 60 P.2d 1115 (1936); Last Chance Ranch v. Erickson, 82 Utah 475, 25 P.2d 952 (1933); Naisbitt v. Hodges,
6 Utah 2d 116, 307 P.2d 620 (1957); Rosenbrcmgh v.
Bramch, 117 Utah 74, 213 P.2d 333 (1949); Forrester v.
Cook, 77 Utah 137, 252 Pac, 206 (1930); Kier v. Condrach,
25 Utah 2d 139, 478 P.2d 327 (1970); and Gray v. Gray,
108 Utah390,160 P.2d 432 (1945).
And see the similar case of Nelson v. Daugherty,
357 P.2d 425, 432-33 (Okl. 1960), where the Court found
9
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a mutual mistake in a conveyance dealing with the reservation of mineral rights. The Court said :
In such case we have, following our earlier
cases, held in Fabbro v. Eeese, 206 Okl. 665, 246
P.2d 324, 325, in the syllabus as follows:
" 1 . In an action for the reformation of a
deed or contract of sale, parol evidence is admissible to show the parties' intent and mutual mistake.
"2. Evidence to sustain a judgment reforming a written contract must be clear, unequivocal, and decisive, but this does not mean that it
must be uncontradicted; and the judgment of the
trial court in such an action, where the evidence
is conflicting, should be given weight, and should
be affirmed on appeal, unless the appellate court
is satisfied that the standard of proof required
has not been met and the conclusion reached is
wrong."
In the body of the opinion, that court said:
" I n Harrell v. Nash, 192 Okl. 95, 133 P.2d
748, 750, we said:

_..-*

"Evidence to sustain a judgment reforming
a written contract must be clear, unequivocal, and
decisive, but does not mean that it must be uncontradicted ; and the judgment of the trial court
in such an action, reforming the contract, where
the evidence is conflicting should be given weight,
and should be affirmed on appeal, unless the appellate court is satisfied that the standard of
proof required has not been met and the conclusion reached is wrong."
In Crabb v. Chisum, 183 Okl. 138, 80 P.2d
653, we considered a case where the factual situation was very similar to that involved in the
10
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instant case. The mistake in the notes in that
case was due to an error on the part of the scrivener, which was not noticed by the plaintiff until
long subsequent to the date of the execution of
the notes. In that case we affirmed the judgment
of the trial court granting reformation, although
the evidence was conflicting, pointing out that
the trial court, which had the witnesses before it
and had an opportunity to observe their demeanor
and to determine their credibility, had decided
this issue in favor of the plaintiffs.

M

In Walter v. Myers, 206 Okl. 100, 241 P.2d
393, 394 (1952), paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of the
syllabus it was stated:
" 1 . In a suit for reformation of a deed it
is competent to show the conduct, declarations
and statements of the parties just before and
at the time of the execution of the instruments.

;..-.

f

" 2. An action for the reformation of a deed,
based upon mistake of fact, is an action of equitable cognizance. The general rule is that when,
because of a mistake of fact, an instrument does
not express the true intention of the parties,
equity will correct such mistake unless the rights
of third parties intervene.''

In the present case, no third party rights were impaired by the parties' mistake. Thus, this case is an
appropriate one for equitable relief.
In Intermowntain Farmers Assn. v. Peart, 30 Utah
2d 201, 515 P.2d 614 (1973), this Court affirmed a decision by Judge Sorensen wherein he admitted certain
parol evidence to show that a mutual mistake had been
committed. This Court held:

11
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It should be noted that the plaintiff intended to
convey two acres and the defendants did not expect to receive more than two acres. It thus appears that there was a mutual mistake in the conveyance which described five acres....
The trial court having found the issues in
favor of the plaintiff on its request to have the
deed reformed and against the defendants on
their counterclaim, and the findings of the court
being supported by the evidence, we find no basis
to interfere with the findings or the judgment
entered by the court below. [Emphasis added.]
In the present case, as in Peart, the Appellants
did not expect to receive what they now claim through
litigation. This fact was proved not only by the parol
evidence involving matters preceding the execution of
the lease, but also by the additional testimony of Mrs.
Pace, Mr. Burdick, and Mr. Anderton in addition to
the oil lease ratification and affidavit signed by the
Plaintiffs. These matters of evidence are more fully
discussed below. They show clearly that the Plaintiffs
considered themselves as lessees of the surface with no
right or interest in the mineral rights.
Appellants' efforts to employ the parol evidence
rule to hide the true and concurring intent of the parties
are repugnant to law and equity. As aptly stated in the
oft-cited case of Andersonian Inv. Co. v. Wade, 184 Pac.
327, 330 (Wash. 1919):
The parol evidence rule is intended to prevent,
not promote, frauds, and it would be a fraud to
allow a party to a written agreement to enforce
it as written when he has agreed not to do, where
12
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the other on the faith of the agreement, has acted
thereupon to his detriment.
The cases cited by Appellants on the subject of
parol evidence are distinguishable from the case at bar.
For example, the case of E. A. Strout Western Realty
Agency, Inc. v. Broderick, supra, as cited by Plaintiffs
is clearly distinguished from the case at bar. In that
case, the attempt was to change the clear terms of a
written instrument. In the present case, there is not
a word in the instrument about oil or minerals. Plaintiffs attempt to rely on a presumption of which Plaintiffs were not even aware until they consulted lawyers
on the subject.
The case of Rainford v. Ryttmg, 22 Utah 2d 252,
451 P.2d 769 (1969), does not purport to give an exhaustive statement of the parol evidence rule. No issue
of mistake or omitted terms was raised in that case,
and the opinion cannot be deemed as precedent on issues not before the Court in this case. The inclusion
of mistake and omitted terms as exceptions to the parol
evidence rule in the subsequent E. A. Strout decision
cited next above clearly evidences the non-general nature
of Plaintiff's quotation from the Rainford case.
The case of Jensen v. Rice, 7 Utah 2d 276, 323 P.2d
259 (1958), concerned a claimed unilateral mistake in
the execution of a conditional sales contract for the purchase of an automobile. The instant case concerns, as
the trial court found, omitted terms resulting from the
mutual mistake of the parties. As the Jensen decision
13
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

indicated, a court should first seek to determine the intention of the contracting parties; if that intention is
embodied in the written contract, such contract will be
enforced. If, as the trial court found herein, such intention is not embodied in the written contract as a result of mutual mistake, parol evidence is proper to enable the court to determine the intent. There having
been no manifestation of assent in the written document
on the issue of oil rights, the Jensen case cannot be controlling herein.
In the case of Davidson v. Bobbins, 30 Utah 2d 338,
517 P.2d 1026 (1973), the Supreme Court held that no
contract existed between the parties as a result of the
alleged agreement's failure to include a sufficient legal
description of the property to be conveyed to enable
the court to grant specific performance. The distinction
is drawn between identification of the interest conveyed
by parol evidence and of using such evidence to supply
a missing description. In the instant case there is no
question as to the geographical location of the property
involved; the question is one of identifying what interests were intended to pass with the described land. Parol
evidence is properly allowed to identify the interest
which the parties intended to pass when by mutual mistake the otherwise proper legal description did not expressly reserve such interests as were not intended to
pass. See E. A. Strout v. BrodericJc, supra. The trial
court properly identified the interest which was to pass
as not including mineral rights. Such a result is not at
variance with the holding of the Dcwidson case.

14
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The case of Clyde v. Eddington Canning Co., 10 Utah
2d 14, 347 P.2d 563 (1959), concerned an attempt to vary
the clearly expressed intention on a personal guarantee
by parol evidence on the basis of a unilateral mistake.
That case has no precedential value where, as here, there
is no express reservation of mineral rights and a finding of mutual mistake resulting in the omission. To the
same effect is the case of Lenman v. Jones, 221 U.S.
51, 32 S.Ct. 18, 56 L.Ed. 89 (1911), which similarly involved only a claimed unilateral mistake.
There are numerous Utah cases dealing with reformation of an instrument on the ground of mutual mistake such as was present here. Plaintiffs-Appellants
make no attempt to distinguish any of those cases. For
example, see Naisbitt v. Hodges, 6 Utah 2d 116, 307 P.2d
620, 623 (1957), and cases cited therein:
*>

The guiding criteria are well established. Mutual
mistake of fact may be defined as error in reducing the concurring intentions of the parties
to writing. Peterson v. Paulson, 24 Wash. 2d 166,
163 P.2d 830 (1945).
This principle has consistently been applied in
equity throughout the reformation of instrument
cases. Sine v. Harper, 118 Utah 415, 222 P.2d
571; Gray v. Gray, 108 Utah 388, 160 P.2d 432;
Nordfors v. Knight, 90 Utah 114, 60 P.2d 1115;
George v. Fritsch Loan & Trust C, 69 Utah 460,
256 P.400; Cram v. Reynolds, 55 Utah 384, 186
P.100; Wherritt v. Dennis, 48 Utah 309, 159 P.
534; "Weight v. Bailey, 45 Utah 584, 147 P. 899;
Deseret National Bank v. Dinwoodey, 17 Utah 43,
15
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53 P. 215; Ewing v. Keith, 16 Utah 312, 52 P.4.
[Emphasis added.]
In the instant case, as under the Naisbitt language
cited above, there was an error in reducing the plain
and concurring intentions of the parties to writing. This
is mutual mistake as the trial court properly found and
serves as a correct basis for reforming the lease-option
agreement.
In addition to the testimony of the Defendant, Mrs.
Pace, coupled with the failure of the Plaintiff, Mr. Bench,
to testify that he intended to lease with option to purchase the mineral rights of the property in question,
Dawn Brown, a daughter of Defendant, testified that
before the signing:
My mother told Mr. Bench that the place was
going for twenty thousand; that there would be
no mineral rights; and ask him if he understood
that, and he said, "Yes, I do. I am not interested
in mineral rights. I just want to get my children
out of the city." T. 116.
Carol Jameson testified that at the time of the signing:
I remember Erma [Pace] saying — telling Mr.
Bench that none of the oil went with it, and I
remember Mr. Bench telling Erma that he wasn't
interested in anything like that. T. 118.
Thus, the mutual mistake of fact, consisting of the
error in reducing the concurring intentions of the parties
to writing, occurred either when Plaintiff Bench failed
16
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to properly instruct his attorney, or his attorney failed
to clearly set down the intentions of the parties.
The contract does not employ the usual terms of
conveying "the following described real estate." The
contract stated,
[T]he Owners have agreed to LEASE and subsequently SELL to the buyers that certain one
hundred twenty (120) acre irrigated farm located
approximately ten miles northwest of the city of
Roosevelt, County of Duchesne, state of Utah, and
more particularly described as follows:
NE y4 NE y 4 ; Sec, 28, T 1 S., R. 2W.,
TJ.S.M. and also E y2 SE y 4 ; Sec. 21, T.
1 S., R. 2W., TJ.S.M.
*
u

The Owners have agreed to lease the farm to
the Buyers with a guaranteed purchase option,
the lease period not to exceed three (3) years
beginning September 15,1965. [Emphasis added.]
On cross-examination, Mrs. Pace testified:
[I]t was agreed that the oil right was to go
with me. He [Mr. Bench] was to get the farm
only. (R. 10). [Emphasis added.]

A review of the document shows that this intent was
expressed— at least partially.
At any time during this three-year lease
period, the Buyers shall have the option to " purchase" the farm on the following terms and conditions : . . . [Emphasis added.] (Ex. 21)
The reference to the farm as opposed to the more customary "above-described real estate" or "property de17
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scribed above" illustrates the parties' mistake and at
the very least creates an ambiguity requiring further
clarification. Mrs. Pace attempted to explain her mistake at the trial as follows (B. 113) :3

v

Q [by Mr. Boyden]: Mrs. Pace, you stated to
Mr. Black that at the time you entered into this
lease, Exhibit 2, that you knew before you signed
it that the mineral reserves ought to be — or
that the minerals ought to be reserved. What
did you mean by that ?
A. I meant we had talked it over and I figured
that he knew they were to come to me. I didn't
have any idea that he figured they went with the
farm. [Emphasis added.]

Again, at T. 77, the question was asked,
Q. Can you tell me what you meant by that [reference to ii farm'' in Ex. 2] ?
A. That was the farm only. [Emphasis added.]
3
Although counsel for Appellants make repeated reference to a
certain question asked by Mr. Black regarding Mrs. Pace's knowledge
of the failure to have an express mineral reservation in the contract
(App. Br. 6, 32, 55), they conspicuously omit her explanation. When
Mr. Black received his answer, he abruptly changed subjects because it
was apparent she was not truly expressing her thoughts. (T. 110). It
was on redirect examination that Mrs. Pace was given her first opportunity to explain her answer (T. 113). In fair and proper sequence
the full answer is as follows:
(T. 110)
Q: You were aware very early in the proceedings of the failure
to have the reservation of oil and gas rights in the document, were
you not?
A: I was aware that it should have been in there before I ever
signed it.

(T. 113)
Q: . . . What did you mean by that?
A: I meant we had talked it over and I figured that he knew
they were to come to me. I didn't have any idea that he figured
they went with the farm.
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Thus, to the parties' understanding, the lease-option
agreement did reserve the questioned oil, gas, and mineral rights to Mrs. Pace and gave an option to the Plaintiffs to buy only the farm— without any mineral rights.
This can also be seen by the usage of the term " f a r m "
which was carried over to the lease extension agreement signed by both parties on May 22, 1967, and which
provided in part (Ex. 16):
Be it known that as of this date, May 22,
1967, the undersigned parties to a lease agreement regarding a farm located in Duchesne
County . . . [Emphasis added.]
There is no doubt in light of the overwhelming
weight of the evidence that the parties both possessed
"concurring intentions" on this point. In Mr. Bench's
letter agreeing to return to the rental arrangement, he
stated:
It is only our desire and intention to purchase
the farm as per our original lease-purchase agreement and the terms there outlined (Ex. 10). [Emphasis added. 1
The parties clearly knew that they did not intend to
include oil, gas, and mineral rights in the transaction.
They merely intended to lease the farm — or the surface — without the minerals.
To the extent that the Agreement should have contained words more explicitly reserving mineral rights
to the Defendant, the parties were mistaken. But neither
the Plaintiffs nor the Defendant was aware of this

m
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mistake at the date of execution of the contract. The
dispute was created at a later date as hereinbefore explained.
3. The Subsequent Conduct Of The Parties Showed
Their Intent To Reserve The Oil, Gas, And Mineral Rights To The Defendant.
In addition to the evidence which was admitted to
show the intent of the parties at the time the leaseoption was executed, other corroborating evidence was
admitted which further demonstrated that the intent of
the parties was to reserve the oil, gas, and mineral rights
to the Defendant, Mrs. Pace.
Thus, even if all prior and contemporaneous testimony were disregarded, there would still be ample evidence remaining to clearly show the parties' intent and
require reformation within the rule as established by
this court in Naisbitt, supra.
In Naisbitt, the Court stated:
The sufficiency of the evidence in this case
- cannot be doubted when viewed in its entirety and
in light of the findings of the trial court.
In Naisbitt, the Court then itemized what the record
disclosed. "We follow the same procedure and limit references only to matters occurring after the signing of
the lease.
First, Mrs. Pace testified that on two occasions
long after the lease was signed, Mr. Bench sought to
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buy some of her interest in the oil rights to the property.
She testified :
There was twice when he asked me if I could
change my mind or wouldn't change my mind
about the oil rights. (T. 82.)
These occasions occurred in 1968 and 1969 when Mr.
Bench had stopped at Mrs. Pace's house to make his
rental payments (T. 82).
Second, and very importantly, two independent witnesses also testified that Mr. Bench had informed them
as late as the fall of 1973 that he had never intended
to buy any oil rights from Mrs. Pace and that he knew
that she never intended to sell such rights, but only due
to the advice of an attorney had he decided to try to take
them from her. Max Burdick, a Roosevelt businessman,
testified concerning a conversation with Plaintiff Bench
occurring in September, 1973 (T. 122-23):
He [Mr. Bench] said he remembered that Erma
[Pace] had told him in the beginning that she
didn't want to sell her oil rights. And I told him
I knew this was true, because I had tried to buy
them previously to that and she had refused to
sell them to me. She said she wouldn't sell for
no price. And then he told me, he said, that he
went to see his attorneys in Salt Lake and they
had talked. He went to see them about some kind
of fire insurance on the old [Pace] house or
something like this. And they had found a flaw
in the contract and told him they figured they
could get the oil rights for him.

21
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Testimony on the fee arrangement between the attorney
and Mr. Bench was stricken by the Court. (T. 122)
- -'"••

I told him [Mr. Bench] I had offered to buy the
oil rights previously to that time from Erma
[Mrs. Pace] and I would have paid her more
than he paid for the whole ranch just for the oil
rights if she would have sold them, but she absolutely refused to sell them for any price.

Mr. Burdick further testified:
Mr. Bench also told me that he knew at the time
that him and Mrs. Pace made the contract that
he knew he wasn't buying the oil rights, and he
knew — that he didn't know this until his attorneys — until he talked to his attorneys later.
Tom Anderton, another businessman in the area,
also had a conversation with Mr. Bench in September,
1973. Mr. Anderton stated:
Now we had a lengthy conversation also in
which Eeid [Bench] told me that when the con. ; tract was entered into there was no mineral rights
that was transferred with the property and he
knew t h a t . . . .
#

#

#

Okay, and he [Mr. Bench] said that he had some
negotiations with Erma [Pace] on her property
to renegotiate the mineral rights, and he could
not get any negotiations; therefore, he was going
to sue for the full mineral rights on the property.... (T.129.)
Third, in the summer of 1972, the Plaintiffs themselves signed two documents stating that they had no
claim to the oil rights in the subject property which
oil rights had been leased by Mrs. Pace over ten years
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before. Exhibit 12, executed on June 1, 1972, by Plaintiff, states in relevant part:
The undersigned (Reid D. Bench), of lawful
age, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
That he occupies the above described land as
lessee of surface, with option to purchase, from
Erma Pace, the owner thereof; that he became
such lessee on the 15th day of September, 1965,
and that his tenancy is for eight years and will
expire on the 15th day of September, 1973. That
he claims no title to said land other than as tenant
with option to purchase as aforesaid, and does
hereby state and declare that his right to possession in no way interferes with the right to said
owner to lease said lands for oil and gas development purposes, and that his possession as tenant is subject to the rights of any lessee or assignee under any oil and/or gas lease executed
by such owner. [Emphasis added.]
Plaintiff later claimed that he intended to delete the
term "lessee of the surface" but omitted to do so (T.
46). The trial court evidently did not credit that testimony. But even if that term were deleted, it is clear
from the balance of the affidavit that the Plaintiffs
claimed no right to the oil rights.
(Similarly, on July 6, 1972, Plaintiffs executed a ratification of the oil lease renewal signed by Mrs. Pace
on June 30, 1971. That ratification states in part (Ex.
13):
The undersigned [Plaintiffs] . . . do hereby
ratify, approve and confirm that certain oil and
gas lease dated June 30, 1971, executed by Erma
Marie Pace. . . ; the undersigned hereby fully
recognize said oil and gas lease as being in full
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force and effect as though the undersigned had
personally signed, sealed and acknowledged the
same. The undersigned are tenants with option
to purchase from Erma Marie Pace.
The subject oil lease (Ex. 11) provided that all the oil
royalties from the subject property were to be paid to
Mrs. Pace. The Plaintiffs clearly consented to that arrangement and plainly considered themselves as mere
tenants with an unexercised option to purchase. These
documents were executed nearly seven years after the
original lease was executed. They indicate that Plaintiffs believed they had no interest in oil rights even
then. They further show that Plaintiffs considered themselves as tenants under a lease-option agreement expiring on September 15,1973.
Thus, on the basis of the foregoing testimony and
evidence the Trial Court found:
By clear, satisfactory, definite and convincing evidence, it was established that the lease and
option contract through mutual mistake omitted
the reservation of the minerals and failed to conform to the intent of the parties at the time of
the execution of the instrument in that the oil,
gas, and mineral rights were not reserved to the
Defendant. (Finding of Fact No. 4).
In light of the overwhelming weight of the evidence
referred to above, there was no doubt that the parties
had erroneously omitted the express reservation of mineral rights from the lease-option agreement. The Trial
Court properly reformed the agreement to conform to
the parties' intent.
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4. The Statute Of Frauds Does Not Prevent The
Beformation Of The Lease-Option In This Case.
Plaintiffs-Appellants urge upon this Court that the
equity powers of reformation of instruments are limited
by the Statute of Frauds. No ease is cited which supports this unique assertion. All of the cases cited above
dealing with the reformation of documents in real estate
transactions would tend to controvert Appellants' argument.
The old case of Papanickolas v. Sampson, 73 Utah
404, 272 Pac, 856 (1929), which is cited and quoted by
Appellants, does not support Appellants' theory. Papcmickolas was not an action to reform a document so
that it would conform to the parties' intent, but rather
it involved an attempt by one party to enforce an oral
contract for the sale of land. Upon a directed verdict
refusing to require such sale, the Court found that there
was no substantial evidence supporting the Appellant
and, therefore, affirmed the lower court's decision. Specifically, the Court found that there was no evidence of
mistake or fraudulent intent as there is in the present
case.
Indeed, Appellants seem to ignore the rule that the
Statute of Frauds will not be enforced where the result
would be to perpetrate a fraud. See Easton v. Wycoff,
4 Utah 2d 386, 332 P.2d 332, 334 (1956), which is incorrectly cited by Appellants. The Easton case points
out that the Statute of Frauds would not be applied in
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a case where such application of the Statute would operate to defraud.
It should be noted that in this case, it was not necessary that the trial court find the Appellants guilty of
fraud. But, if there were no mistake, as Appellants contend, and if Appellants knew the contract conveyed minerals contrary to their express agreement, a court of
equity surely would not assist in such an effort to defraud.
It has been clear from the inception of this case
that Plaintiffs-Appellants have desired to utilize the
Statute of Frauds (and the parol evidence rule) to keep
from the trier of fact certain evidence demonstrating
the true intent of the parties. While Justice may be
blind, She is not ignorant or insensitive to truth, and
Appellants' efforts to conceal the truth in this case are
so obvious that they could not possibly go unnoticed.
In fact, Appellants' efforts at concealment only serve
to call attention to the conduct of the Plaintiffs in seeking to obtain from a widow more than their bargain
provided for. No legal principle requires the application
of the Statute of Frauds to perpetrate such an injustice.
Utah cases, including even the cases cited by PlaintiffsAppellants, point out that such a result will not be permitted by Utah courts.

26
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5. Plaintiffs-Appellants' Position Kegarding Fraud
Is A Strawman Argument.
The findings of fact in this case make no mention
of fraud. Yet, Plaintiffs-Appellants devote twelve pages
of their Brief to argue that there was no fraud.
Defendant raised the issue of fraud in her Answer
as an alternative defense along with the defense of mistake. In short, Defendant's position was simply that
either the parties made a mutual mistake or else Defendant made a mistake and Plaintiffs committed fraud.
The Trial Court found by clear and convincing evidence
that there had been a mutual mistake. Thus, the issue
of fraud as belabored in Plaintiffs' Brief is merely a
strawman beyond the trial court's decision.
It was not necessary for the trial court to find fraud
because it appeared that the failure to include an express mineral reservation in the contract was a mutual
mistake.
Nevertheless, if there were no mistake, there would
be fraud, and specific performance being an equitable action Plaintiffs must do equity. In view of the
Plaintiffs' repeated statements that he knew he was not
leasing or buying the mineral rights, equity forbids him
to gainsay his own acts and assertions.
Perhaps two of the most basic rules of equity are
that he who seeks equity must do equity (Carbon Canal
Co. v. Sanpete Water Users Ass'n, 19 Utah 2d 6, 425
P.2d 405 (1967)), and that equitable relief will be de27
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nied where the Plaintiff lacks "clean hands" or where
he is guilty of deceit or an impure motive (see, e.g.,
Iven v. Roder, 431 P.2d 321 (Okl. 1967)).
Suffice it to say, as was indicated in the Andersoman case quoted above, "it would be a fraud to allow
a party to a written agreement to enforce it as written
when he has agreed not to do so." If there were no
mutual mistake here, there would be a fraud.
6. The Lease And Option Expired Without Being
Exercised And Plaintiffs Have No Eemaining
Interest In The Property.
The entire foregoing discussion is mooted to some
extent by the fact that the Plaintiffs never properly
exercised their option and the lease agreement expired
as of September 15, 1973. The evidence admitted during the trial clearly established this fact. A review of
that evidence demonstrates that the Trial Court properly concluded:
Regardless of whether Plaintiffs properly exercised their option to purchase, they acquiesced
in the return of their down payment and agreed
to continue under the lease agreement and their
right to exercise their option expired with the
termination of the lease extension on September
15,1973. (Conclusions of Law No. 6.)
The lease-option agreement specifically provided,
" I t is agreed and understood that the payment of the
above rentals shall be a consideration for the granting
of the option to purchase contained herein" (Ex. 2).
28
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Mr. Bench admitted during his testimony that he
had not made the specified payments in a timely fashion
(T. 52, 58). Exhibit 19, which was prepared by Mr.
Bench, revealed that throughout virtually the entire first
six years of the lease period, Mr. Bench was in arrears,
often by several hundred dollars.
On April 1, 1969, Mr. Bench agreed to pay the additional charges incurred by Mrs. Pace because of Mr.
Bench's delinquent rental payments (Ex. 4). Mr. Bench
never paid or tendered those additional charges (T. 59).
On January 8, 1971, Mr. Bench and Mrs. Pace discussed the sale of the property. At that time, Mr. Bench
presented a check to Mrs. Pace in the amount of $2,000.00,
but Mr. Bench did not tender payment of the late charges,
nor did he tender any pro-rated payment of the $600.00
annual farm lease rental (T. 84).
The parties agreed to enter into a new agreement
which would provide for the sale of the subject property. Mrs. Pace presented a proposal (Ex. 6) and Mrs.
Bench also presented a proposal in her own handwriting (Ex. 20). Both parties had raised objections concerning the initial lease-option agreement.
Mr. Bench delayed in signing the new agreement.
Finally, on April 5, 1971, Mr. Bench was notified that
if a new agreement could not be reached, the former
lease arrangement would continue (Ex. 7).
Mr. Bench responded to that notice by listing his
objections to the new proposed agreement (Ex. 8). Those
29
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objections included the failure of the new agreement to
accumulate past rent payments as payments against
principal and the requirement that he pay property and
water taxes. Mr. Bench suggested the need for further
discussions, but did not object in any way to the reservation of mineral rights which was expressly set forth
in the new proposal.
On June 2, 1971, Mrs. Pace returned the $2,000.00
payment to Mr. Bench, advising him:
[T]he place just isn't for sale without a signed
sale contract. You are now back on the lease contract. (Ex. 17).
On June 15, 1971, Mr. Bench wrote to Mrs. Pace
(Ex. 10) and stated:
u
In accordance with your letter dated June 2nd
[Ex. 17] and Mr. Beaslins of May 4 [Ex. 7] I am
enclosing $1,200.00. This mil pay the full amount
due under the lease agreement for the year 1971.
I plan to invest the balance of the funds you returned to me in hopes of being able to again come
forward with at least a $2,000.00 down payment
before Jan. 1972.
?

*

#

#

Mr. Bench also noted several objections to the proposed
contract, but again failed to raise any objection conr
cerning mineral rights. ?r ,i
;
M *
Mr. Bench continued to make rent payments, but
did not "come forward with" the down payment as he
indicated in his letter. . ; • • . ; , .
':••:..
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On June 1, 1972, Mr. Bench signed a proof of possession (Ex. 12) wherein he admitted that he considered himself as a tenant with an option to purchase. On
July 7, 1972, both Mr. and Mrs. Bench signed a ratification agreement approving Mrs. Pace's oil lease of the
subject property and again stated that they were tenants with an option to purchase (Ex. 13).
The foregoing evidence illustrates the following
points:
(1) The Plaintiffs failed to provide the consideration required in the lease-option agreement
and therefore precluded the possibility of their
exercise of the option.
(2) The Plaintiffs never tendered a sufficient amount of money to exercise their option.
They never tendered late charges or the prorated
farm rental due.
(3) The parties agreed that an additional
agreement was required to culminate the transaction.4

•,

(4) The parties were unable to agree upon
terms, but the question of oil rights was never
objected to by Plaintiffs.
(5) The Plaintiffs accepted the return of
their moneys and agreed to return to the lease
arrangement.
(6) Plaintiffs considered themselves as tenants with an unxercised option to purchase as late
as July 7,1972.

4
The original lease-option agreement was defective in that the
formula for payment of the purchase price did not require the eventual payment of the full price; no method of conveyance was specified;
and the property description was inadequate or uncertain. Many other
usual terms were omitted. Although these were not essential, they
all formed the basis for the parties' agreement that a new contract
was needed.
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The lease finally expired as of September 15, 1973.
Defendant served a notice to quit at that time (Ex. 21).
Thus, the Trial Court was correct in ruling that
the lease-option had expired and that the Plaintiffs have
no remaining interest in the subject property. Because
this is true, it is academic whether the lease-option reserved the mineral rights. Since Plaintiffs now have
no right under that expired lease, the question of the
mineral reservation is mooted.
Appellants argue in their brief (pp. 50-54) that the
option was exercised. The foregoing facts upon which
the trial court relied showed clearly that the option was
never properly exercised (Findings of Fact No. 11 and
Conclusion of Law No. 5). The language of the leaseoption agreement was far from clear, contrary to what
Appellants suggest. But, more importantly, Appellants
never tendered a sufficient sum to exercise their option,
nor did they make their rental payments timely.
In addition, the parties agreed to prepare a new
agreement. The Plaintiffs and the Defendant proposed
several additional new terms for the new agreement.
Most importantly, when agreement upon the new
contract appeared unlikely, the parties agreed in writing to continue to be governed by the lease arrangement
(Exs. 6, 7, 8, 17, 20,10). Appellants conspicuously avoid
referring to that agreement in their Brief. Nevertheless, the agreement was made in writing and rental payments were made pursuant to that agreement (Ex. 19,
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T. 52, 58). Plaintiffs signed two additional documents
confirming their intentions to continue their status as
lessees. (Exs. 12,13).
Appellants attempt to excuse their failure to exercise their option by arguing that the Defendant would
have rejected such an effort. They presented no evidence to prove such an assertion. The trial court weighed
the evidence which was presented and found contrary
to the Plaintiffs on this issue. It is untimely and improper to suggest on appeal that evidence should now
be imagined that a proper tender could have or would
have been made by the Plaintiffs and also that the Defendants should be presumed to have rejected any proper
tender.
Moreover, Plaintiffs' assertion (at p. 53 of their
Brief) that they in effect could abrogate the agreement
of the parties to follow the lease arrangement by the
making of allegations in a complaint for specific performance are equally unsuppor table. No case law stands
for such a proposition and the trial court obviously did
not so find.
The facts omitted by Plaintiffs in their argument
are crucial to this issue. Those facts were found by the
trial court to be contrary to Plaintiffs' current position
on appeal. Those findings should not now be disturbed
by hypothetical arguments.

33
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

.

7. The Other Issues Raised by Plaintiffs-Appellants
Are Without Merit.
a. Statute of Limitations.

-•••• Plaintiffs-Appellants suggested that the statute of
limitations bars the defenses of fraud or mistake in
this case. This argument is faulty in three respects:
First, the cases cited do not stand for the proposition
that the statute of limitations bars the defenses of fraud
and mistake. The cases merely state that a cause of
action is barred.
The ultimate purpose of the limitation law is thus
to bar actions rather than to suppress or deny matters
of defense. This purpose is aptly stated in the case of
Liter v. Hoagland, 305 Ky. 329, 204 S.W. 2d 219, 220
(1947), stating:
Limitation law is not intended to bar nor smother
any mere defense of a party so as to compel him
to stand dumb and mute while his antagonist
bludgeons his head with every weapon in the book
of legal, offensive warfare.
The rule is well-settled in other jurisdictions, including Utah, that such statutes are not applicable to defenses, but apply only where affirmative relief is sought.
See generally, 78 A.L.R. 1074 and the numerous cases
cited therein.
The above general rule is particularly applied in
cases where the statute of limitations is pleaded as a
defense to fraud. See Miles v. Parkinson, 196 Okl. 414,
165 P.2d 644, 646 (1946), which states the general rule
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that the statutes limiting actions after discovery of
fraud apply only as against actions, and not defenses.
That ease involved an action to obtain title under a
county commissioner's deed, where county commissioners sought to justify their action in refusing to deliver
deed after sale of property acquired by county at tax
resale had been consummated on the ground that the
purchaser had practiced fraud in procuring the sale.
The Court held that the commissioners were not precluded by statute of limitations from setting up other
defense of fraud because they did not set up their defense until long after expiration of two years from date
of discovering alleged fraud. Put another way:
Limitations do not run against defenses; the statute of limitations is available only as a shield,
not as a sword. Dredge Corporation v. Wells
Cargo, Inc., 80 Nev. 99, 389 P.2d 394, 396 (1964).
In accord is the case of Styles v. Bodkin, 43 Ca. 2d 839,
111 P.2d 675, 678 (1941), stating that makers of a note
could defend action on the note on the ground of fraud
and the defense would not be barred by latches or by
limitation.
Utah is in line with the general rule that statutes
of limitation apply to actions, not defenses. In Stewart
Livestock Company v. Ostler, 105 U. 529, 144 P.2d 276,
284 (1943), the Court holds:
Though a claim may be barred by the statute of
limitations insofar as the right to recover a judgment is concerned, such claim may be set off
against an adversary's claim,
. ,v. ,
/,, ;
»

#

#
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A creditor who takes security for payment without delivering full consideration which represented he was giving cannot plead statutes of
limitation to a plea of partial failure of consideration.
Thus, Ostler allowed the defendant debtor's crossdemands against the plaintiff creditor to stand.
In short, raising the statute of limitations as a bar
to defenses of fraud and mistake is a mere red herring
designed to conceal the truth from the scales of justice.
The Courts have rejected this type of concealment.
A second weakness in the statute of limitation argument arises from the fact that the first time the
fraud or mistake in this case was brought to the attention of the Defendant was when the complaint was filed.
The defenses were raised long before the expiration of
a three-year period. Weighing the evidence, the Trial
Court so found (Conclusions of Law, No. 4). PlaintiffsAppellants incorrectly state that Mrs. Pace knew about
the mistake (or fraud) in 1965. She testified that she
thought the oil, gas, and mineral rights had been reserved to her because she was only conveying an interest in the " f a r m " (seeR, 110,113).
Thus, Mrs. Pace made her mistake in 1965 but did
not know it had been made until the Plaintiffs sued her
in late 1972. Her responsive pleading timely raised the
defenses of fraud and mistake. She was not negligent,
as Appellants incorrectly assert (at p. 38 of their Brief),
in seeking to correct the mutual mistake.
>
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Mrs. Pace was not schooled in the law and obviously
did not have any idea Plaintiffs would seek to take her
oil rights from her. Everything Plaintiffs did led her
to believe that there was absolutely no problem in this
regard until the complaint was filed.
A third weakness in the statute of limitations argument is found in the fact that Plaintiff failed to raise
this issue in the pretrial hearing. It was not made a
part of the pretrial order. Plaintiffs' counsel did not
raise this issue until after the pretrial order had been
entered and finalized and the trial set.
b. Failure to Produce Son as a Witness.
Defendant called three witnesses who testified concerning the pre-execution discussions and intent of the
parties. Plaintiffs objected to that testimony at trial.
Now, Plaintiffs assert that a further cumulative witness should have been called to testify to the same matters and that Defendant's failure to do so has some significance.
Defendant submits that this argument is totally
without support and certainly does not in any way detract from the great weight of clear and convincing
evidence already in the Record.
It might just as easily be asked why Plaintiff Mrs.
Alta Bench did not testify or, if she really was unable
to attend the trial, why her testimony was not brought
in by way of deposition. A similar question could be
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asked concerning the notary who, according to Plaintiff
Bench (but denied by Mrs. Pace), witnessed the parties'
signatures.
Moreover, nothing prevented the Plaintiffs from
calling Aaron Pace as an adverse witness.
Appellants also argue (at p. 54 of their Brief) that
Defendant failed to carry her burden of proof which
was to show that both Mrs. Pace and her son, Aaron,
had been mistaken. However, this argument is unfounded. The evidence which was admitted at the trial
showed that Aaron Pace was present at the time the
initial discussions were held and that he was in attendance when Mr. Bench and Mrs. Pace agreed that the
mineral rights were not to be transferred. There was
absolutely no evidence introduced which would in any
way indicate that Aaron Pace had any understanding
other than that which would flow from the discussions
of the Plaintiffs and the Defendant.
CONCLUSION
When Appellants' efforts at obfuscation are stripped away, the simple facts of this case remain: Plaintiffs and Defendant never intended to include the oil,
gas, and mineral rights as a part of the lease-option for
the farm. Plaintiffs never properly exercised the option but did agree in writing, to return to lease basis.
The trial court was not deceived or thwarted by
Plaintiffs' posture in this case. Upon competent, clear,
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and convincing evidence, the trial court entered its findings and conclusions and judgment. It is submitted that
the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
DATED: April 10,1975
Respectfully submitted,
BOYDEN, KENNEDY, EOMNEY
& HOWARD
By John S. Boyden
By John Paul Kennedy
Attorneys for Defendant
Erma Marie Pace
1000 Kennecott Building
10 East South Temple Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that three true and correct copies
of the foregoing Brief of Respondent Erma Pace were
mailed to Mr. Richard Dibblee, Attorney for PlaintiffsAppellants, 10 West Broadway, Salt Lake City, Utah
84101, this 10th day of April, 1975, by First Class, postage prepaid mail.
John S. Boyden
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